Chairman Xi Jinping recently removed another prominent figure from the PLA

Hong Kong: Numerous media outlets and sources claim that Chairman Xi Jinping just expelled yet another well-known member of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This time, it is none other than General He Weidong, the second of two vice-chairs of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), who is ranked second in the world’s biggest military organisation, after Xi.

If these rumours are correct, the CMC has six members, or at least just five today. This is significant since, since 1967, he has been the first uniformed CMC vice-chair to be ousted. Thus, his firing—likely due to corruption, though no formal reason has been provided—represents the PLA’s most significant purge since Xi assumed leadership.

These seeming moves by Xi are a “sign of a major trust and corruption problem within the PLA”, according to Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Centre for China Analysis, a US-based organisation. “This is by far the biggest reorganisation of PLA leadership and state-owned companies engaged in military procurement in recent history,” Morris said. It implies a lack of confidence between Xi and the military as well as severe worry and disarray inside China’s military ranks.

At least 78 senior PLA officers with at least two-star rank have been fired since Xi took over as China’s leader. Eight current or former CMC members are included in this number, demonstrating how Xi’s extensive drive to remove the disloyal and avaricious may affect any position. Admiral Miao Hua, the head of the Political Work Department of the CMC, was the highest-ranking individual to resign before him. He was dismissed six months ago for “serious violations of discipline”, which is a common euphemism for corruption.

As their occupations often overlap, Miao and He really have a close relationship.

For instance, they were both members of the 31st Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, during the time. In this province, where he was in control of army forces at the time, Xi gained experience first as deputy secretary and then as governor. According to Morris, this made He and Miao close confidants in Xi’s inner circle and friends in arms.

He and Xi became close buddies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Morris said, “It is also believed that when Xi was party secretary of Zhejiang, He was stationed in Huzhou, and Xi reportedly visited He and his army corps more than a dozen times.” They overlapped in Fujian Province in the late 1990s.

It is clear from He’s dismissal that Xi erred in the past by quickly elevating him. Morris pointed out that He Weidong’s appointment as the CMC’s second vice-chairman was unexpected. In general Since Xi took office, he has been a career army officer and has been moving up the promotion ladder more quickly. Despite having extensive operational experience, he has never held a position in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee or on the CMC. He was thus on a quick path to become one of Xi’s most trusted military advisers, and his ascent through the ranks to the second vice-chair position is very impressive.”

He enlisted in the PLA in December 1972 and served from May 2016 as the Western Theatre Command’s ground force commander. The disputed boundary with India is part of the region assigned to this command. In 2019, he was elevated to the position of commander of the Eastern Theatre Command, which is primarily responsible for conducting contingency operations in the East China Sea and against Taiwan. He held the position until January 2022.

Morris noted a few things about the importance of his removal. “First, he was probably one of Xi’s most crucial advisers on a Taiwan contingency, considering his experience in the Eastern Theatre Command. It’s unclear what effect, if any, his dismissal will have on the PLA’s Taiwan strategy. It’s difficult to predict if it will have an effect or not.

Second, Xi seems to be targeting the Fujian ‘clique’, since both He Weidong and Miao Hua rose through the ranks of the 31st Group Army, the American scholar said.

In the 31st (now the 73rd) Group Army in Xiamen, Fujian, and even the Eastern Theatre Command, there may be a targeted purging of PLA commanders who overlapped with Xi. One wonders if this will make a difference.

On the Eastern Theatre Command’s backup plans in case of Taiwan.”

Last month, Lieutenant General Tang Yong was relieved. Yong was previously a member of the now-named Eastern Theatre Command from the 1990s to the 2000s. In fact, He had designated him as the Deputy Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission. Once again, the fact that Tang and Miao were affiliated with the Eastern Theatre Command may indicate that a “He Weidong” group had been forming.

The term “CMC chairperson responsibility system”, which refers to Xi’s total authority over the PLA, has been utilised often by him. This is significant because it demonstrated how much lip service he was giving to Xi’s power. In contrast to the case of former defence minister Li Shangfu, it is noteworthy that He’s apparent probe is shrouded in secrecy. During the inquiry, a plea for public leads was made.

Since the CCP’s high-profile Two Sessions meeting in Beijing from March 5 to 5–11, he has not been seen, and rumours of his disappearance started to circulate a few days later. Speculation on the general’s predicament has increased as a result of his absence from activities that a CMC vice-chair would typically attend. On April 8–9, fellow CMC vice-chair Zhang Youxia attended a Politburo-level Central Conference on Work Related to Neighbouring Countries. Although the CCP’s cloak of silence implies otherwise, it is plausible that He is ill.

K. Tristan Tang, writing for the Jamestown Foundation in the United States, noted: “It is still unclear what He Weidong’s present circumstances are. But it’s believable that Xi Jinping stopped believing in He and started looking into him. The fact that Xi was willing to listen to the views of lower-ranking officers during his participation in the PLA delegation at the Two Sessions, in contrast to his prior focus on high-ranking officials, is another indication of a wider but related phenomenon: Xi’s lack of confidence in his senior military officers. Xi’s increasing paranoia outside of the military system is linked to this.

Since the PLA is the CCP’s armed wing, Xi is determined to eradicate cliques and purge the military group. It is the power that supports and maintains party rule and its unquestionable dominance in China.

It is more important than ever for the PLA to uphold and defend CCP authority when internal pressures increase, such as the present economic slump, trade disputes, and international instability. Echoing Mao Zedong, Xi said last year that “the barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party.”

The fact that so many prominent PLA members are facing corruption charges is a little ironic considering that Xi probably has millions of dollars in assets. According to a March 2025 assessment released by the US Director of National Intelligence, the US intelligence agency estimates that Xi has USD 1 billion in concealed wealth via relatives such as brothers, nephews, and nieces. According to this report, bribery and corruption account for up to 65% of all Chinese government officials’ unofficial income. This is really disheartening news for Xi’s anti-graft effort, even though he has already prosecuted five million CCP officials!

According to the paper, “Industry research provides evidence that, as of 2024, Xi’s family retains millions in business interests and financial investments.” It was known that a representative of the Chinese Embassy had tried in vain to have the report removed from the books.

The US research supports information from the 2016 Panama Papers leak, which revealed wealthy Chinese government families had stashed outrageous sums of money in offshore businesses. Since it would be too humiliating, the CCP obviously does not force officials to reveal their holdings in public.

According to the Chinese Communist Party’s unclassified Wealth and Corrupt Activities of the Leadership report, “Corruption is an endemic feature of and challenge for China, enabled by a political system with power highly centralised in the hands of the CCP, a CCP-centric concept of the rule of law, a lack of independent checks on public officials, and limited transparency.” Even if Xi’s anti-corruption drive hasn’t been very successful in eradicating corruption, it has greatly benefitted him politically by eliminating his rivals. In fact, the pogrom aims to eradicate financial criminality just as much as it does to enforce political discipline and ideological purity.

The two Chinese defence ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, as well as the top two commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, which is in control of China’s nuclear missile stockpile, are among the other recent defence establishment leaders to be under investigation for corruption. Last year, there were rumours that Dong Jun, the current defence minister, was being investigated for similar offences. He was recently seen meeting with the head of the Pakistan Air Force, however, suggesting that he was later cleared.

According to Tang of the think tank The Jamestown Foundation, “Xi may have fired He Weidong primarily because of a decline in confidence in his ability to lead the PLA generals. Managing political matters and maintaining discipline are probably among He Weidong’s duties. Despite a ten-year anti-corruption effort inside the PLA, under his leadership, a significant number of PLA generals have been investigated or expelled for disciplinary breaches or other legal infractions since the 20th Party Congress. There were issues with the personnel management and promotion system he managed since several of the impacted generals had been elevated to important positions during his tenure.

Tang added: “Xi has a more serious personnel issue, however, given He Weidong’s probable demise. Only Zhang Youxia is ranked with He Weidong in the PLA; Miao Hua is being investigated; and Zhang Shengmin is not a member of the Central Committee. It’s unlikely that anybody else would possess the rank and experience necessary to assume his responsibilities and successfully lead PLA men.” Thus, it will be intriguing to see how Xi steps in to fill his void.

China still looks externally for defence in spite of all these domestic issues. Ukraine estimates there are around 155 Chinese individuals involved in the conflict, although it has caught two Chinese nationals fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine. This trend is concerning, even if there is yet no concrete proof that the Chinese government is purposefully sending troops to Ukraine.

In fact, Russia is actively hiring, offering incentives including a sign-up bonus and a monthly salary of USD 2,400 in Chinese-language advertising films.

“China is a major enabler of Russia in the war in Ukraine,” US State Department spokesman Tammy Bruce told the media on April 8. Nearly 80% of the dual-purpose supplies Russia needs to continue the fight are supplied by China. China accounts for 80% of the total. According to President Trump, the United States and other nations will become less safe, secure, and affluent if these two nuclear powers maintain their collaboration, which would only increase global instability.